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A ONE-VALUED LOGIC FOR NON-ONE-SIDEDNESS  
 
Fabien Schang1 
 
1. A Constructivist Approach 
 
Does it make sense to employ modern logical tools for ancient philosophy? This well-known 
debate2 has been re-launched by the indologist Piotr Balcerowicz, questioning those who 
want to look at the Eastern school of Jainism with Western glasses. While plainly 
acknowledging the legitimacy of Balcerowicz’s mistrust, the present paper wants to propose 
a formal reconstruction of one of the well-known parts of the Jaina philosophy, namely: the 
saptabhaṅgī, i.e. the theory of sevenfold predication. Before arguing for this formalist 
approach to philosophy, let us return to the reasons to be reluctant at it.  
For one thing, Balcerowicz (2008) made a clear-cut distinction between a constructivist 
and a reductionist method of interpretation. The former is defined by Balcerowicz (2008: 4), 
where the so-called “constructivist” method is not to be confused with the philosophy of 
mathematics and merely amounts to the exercise of formal reconstruction:  
 
“What is called ‘constructivist method’ is such a strategy of examination that, 
while trying to meaningfully analyze the theory, makes use of modern tools and 
epistemology which were not explicitly known in ancient and medieval India, 
although one can see no objection to their application and one thinks their use 
helps one illuminate the issue by ‘dismembering’ its muddled structure or by 
disambiguating expressions which seem to us either indeterminate, obscure or 
equivocal precisely because no such disambiguation tools were available at that 
time.” 
 
                                                            
1 This paper has been presented as a lecture at a conference on “Jaina logic” (London, SOAS, 21-22 March 
2013. I am grateful to the two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 About the philosophers that clearly argued for the explanatory value of formal logic, see e.g. Barnes 2007 and 
Fine 2012. Clarity and accuracy are the two central criteria in the debate between constructivists and 
reductionists. 
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The latter words recall what has always been presented as one of the main tasks of 
philosophy (especially its analytical branch), i.e. clarifying or disambiguating any discourse 
by rephrasing its vocabulary without altering its meaning. But here is precisely the challenge 
Balcerowicz addresses to the method itself: can ancient texts be reformulated by means of 
modern words without being altering their meaning? Whoever replies to this question 
negatively will hardly appreciate the following, thus opting for a so-called “reductionist” 
approach that advances hermeneutic explanations of ancient texts instead of resorting to their 
formalization.  
Before losing every such reader from these preliminary lines onwards, let me propose 
something like a genealogical outline of the formal method I propounded thus far. For the 
reason why any modern philosopher and logician must be attracted by Jainism is related to its 
surprisingly close connection with some contemporary topics of the so-called “philosophical 
logics”. These have been also mentioned by Balcerowicz (2008: 5):  
 
“To recapitulate, the constructivist approach explores what respective authors 
believe are hidden, unexpressed logical structures and logical and philosophical 
implications of the syād-vāda, such as multiple values or paraconsistency of the 
syād-vāda. A real danger of this approach is that it may read modern concepts into 
an ancient theory, albeit the theory allowed no room for them.” 
 
The connection between the Jaina theory of standpoints, or syād-vāda, many-valued logics 
and para-consistency largely accounted for the development of formal reconstructions. At the 
same time, Balcerowicz (2008: 9) favoured the reductionist approach because of its more 
cautious interpretation of the ancient texts. In this respect, I have been blamed for formalizing 
at length while departing from the original sources in an overeager way:  
 
“As a matter of fact some scholars, e.g. Ganeri (2002), to some extent, and Fabien 
Schang en masse, no longer offer a genuine interpretation of the syād-vāda but 
use some ideas of the theory in order to develop independent systems of many-
valued logic which may be of considerable interest in their own right but of little 
interest as formalization attempts of the syād-vāda.” 
 
      And yet, three main confusions in the logical vocabulary are such that a formal re-
construction is in order to have a clearer understanding of Jainism.  
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1.1. Contradiction and Consistency 
 
First and foremost, a crucial clarification is to be made about the twin concepts of 
contradiction and inconsistency. The aforementioned confusion at hand first occurs between 
opposite pairs of concepts like affirmation-negation and truth-falsity: affirmation is not truth 
and negation is not falsity, since an affirmative sentence may be false and a negative sentence 
may be true. While affirmation and negation essentially relate to the logical concept of 
contradiction, truth and falsity relate to the meta-logical Principle of Bivalence (hereafter: 
PB), namely: there is a set of two exhaustive and exclusive truth-values in logic, viz. truth 
and falsity. The notion of contradiction has been introduced by Aristotle’s Metaphysics long 
before the logical school of Jainism emerged with its main representatives, including 
Prabhācandra (9th century C.E.) and Vādideva Sūri (1086-1169).3 Contradiction was 
introduced by the Greek philosopher in the form of a logical principle (in Sanskrit: 
paribhāṣā), namely: the Principle of Non-Contradiction (hereafter: PNC), according to which 
a sentence and its negation cannot be true at once. While noting that there may be several 
plausible formulations of it, PNC is a normative principle: the simultaneous truth of a 
sentence and its negation is something that ought not be the case, insofar, as Łukasiewicz 
(1910) aptly showed, that PNC cannot be proved but should be imposed to the speakers for 
extra-logical reasons.  
The concept of inconsistency is closely related to contradiction. Inconsistency is a 
relation between a sentence and its negation, so that inconsistency and contradiction are on a 
par from the viewpoint of classical logic: if a sentence  is true (or false), then its negation 
 is false (or true) and both cannot be accepted at once by PB. At the same time, the founder 
of the para-consistent trend of dialetheism, Graham Priest argues for the existence of true 
contradictions from Priest (1979). The latter phrase is actually an ill-named case of “true 
inconsistency”, given the normative definition of contradiction as that which cannot be 
accepted within a single logical system. Let us say accordingly that a contradiction expresses 
any inconsistency that cannot be accepted from a given model; this means that the 
inconsistent set of sentences  and  is a contradiction in classical logic but not in e.g. 
Priest’s para-consistent logic, where a third truth-value results from the combination of truth 
and falsity in one and the same truth-value (“both true and false”). We shall return to this 
non-classical device later on, since it concerns one of the forms of inconsistency usually 
associated to the Jaina concept of avaktavyam.  
                                                            
3 Some references of these Jaina philosophers are to be found e.g. in Ganeri 2002. 
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I want to claim in the following that PNC does not essentially concern sentences or 
truth-values but, rather, speech acts and their related statements; this interpretation is in 
accordance to the etymological roots of contradiction, from the Greek antiphasis meaning the 
act of asserting and denying a sentence at once. The reason why such an interpretation has 
been neglected in the literature may be due to a prominently ontological reading of non-
contradiction, following the distinction by Łukasiewicz (1910) between three versions of 
PNC (ontological, logical, and psychological).4 At any rate, I gathered from this relevant 
detail that the debate about contradiction should not be centered around the semantic 
properties of sentences, viz. their truth-values, but refer to what speakers do in using these 
sentences during a discussion. Although some parallel can be made between the pairs truth-
falsity and assertion-denial, the next section shall establish a relevant asymmetry between 
these two pairs of concepts.  
Secondly, the general confusion about the meaning of contradiction should be 
exemplified in the three levels of discourse mentioned by Łukasiewicz (1910): truth and 
falsity, affirmation and negation, but also yes- and no-answers, these being correlated to two 
opposite speech acts about the declarative use of sentences. Some are immediately going to 
say that no difference occurs between both truth and yes-answer, on the one hand, falsity and 
no-answer on the other hand: just as saying “yes” to the question whether a given sentence is 
true is to assert its truth, saying “no” to the same question is to deny its truth and, therefore, to 
assert its falsity. But the latter conclusion is just what fails in a more fine-grained description 
of speech-acts, and the next section will set forth a logical framework accounting for the 
different levels of inconsistency in the saptabhaṅgī.5 
Thirdly, some confusion appeared in the Jaina logic about the way to characterize an 
appropriate model for it, i.e. the set of accepted sentences that are taken to be true. According 
to the import of viewpoints in the Jaina epistemology (anekāntavāda), a special feature of the 
Jaina model is the occurrence of sentences pertaining to different viewpoints within one and 
the same set. It follows from this multiplex view of reality that a sentence can be said to be 
true and false according to the arguments provided for or against it. Here is a clear 
discrepancy with what Ganeri (2001) called the “doctrinalist” approach of Aristotle’s logic, 
i.e. the one-sided view of truth as a one-one correspondence between true sentences and facts 
                                                            
4 An exception is e.g. Dultih Novaes 2007, who clearly stressed upon the dialogical import of the concept of 
contradiction. 
5 The correlation advocated between ‘logic’ and ‘pragmatics’ can be related to some authors with different 
approaches to pragmatics, including Paul Lorenzen’s game semantics or John Searle’s illocutionary logic. See 
especially Lorenzen 1955 and Searle 1969.  
5 
 
of the world. Furthermore, the Jaina non-one-sided doctrine entails that some inconsistencies 
may be accepted inside the same model, whereas contradiction cannot be accepted by 
definition and should be avoided for sake of consistency or, better, coherence); to account for 
the difference between accepted and rejected inconsistencies, I proposed in Schang (2009b) a 
more comprehensive opposition between inconsistency and consistency, in contrast to the 
opposition between contradiction (banned inconsistency) and coherence. 
 
1.2. The Jaina View of Inconsistency 
     
 Now that the conceptual framework is clarified, let us return to the case of Jaina logic and its 
controversial treatment of inconsistency. 
As a least defense of my own interpretation, I propose to expose the rationale through 
which I choose my explanatory method. The following wants to show how my formal 
reconstruction below evolved since the early papers that were the target of right objections.  
A preliminary outline by Schang (2009a) proposed to follow Ganeri (2002) by 
constructing a many-valued (i.e. 7-valued) existential and quasi-truth-functional view of the 
Jaina theory of judgments, or saptabhaṅgī. That is, each of the seven judgments or 
predications was given a single logical value by being reworded as the existence of a single 
viewpoint that makes the corresponding sentence true (hence the generic statement: “there is 
a standpoint S such that the sentence  is true”); at the same time, the formal semantics at 
hand could not determine the logical value of complex statements connected by logical 
constants like conjunction ( and ), disjunction ( or ), or conditional (if  then ). 
Furthermore, this 7-valued interpretation has been extended to a syncretist, 15-valued variant 
in which a twofold interpretation of avaktavyam is proposed without opting for either (the 
“glutty” one: both true and false, or the “gappy” one: “neither true nor false”)6. Admittedly, 
such a construction is at odds with the ancient texts by introducing logical tools that have 
nothing to do with the Jaina tradition. For example, no more logical connectives occurred in 
these texts than in the Aristotelian logic, and nothing suggests the use of more than two truth-
values in the saptabhaṅgī (as Balcerowicz indicated). If so, then it does not make sense to 
talk about a 7-valued logic of viewpoints, not to mention the 15-valued one.  
                                                            
6 “Gappy” refers to the case in which some sentences are “under-determined” in a logical system: there is a gap 
in their meaning, given that these are neither true nor false. And conversely, “glutty” means that the sentences 
are “over-determined” by being both true and false. This conceptual pair glutty-gappy belongs to the current 
parlance of many-valued logics, where the logical systems are defined and interpreted in terms of truth-values.  
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Balcerowicz is thus entirely right to see Schang (2009a) as a purely formal extension 
that cannot account for the Jaina theory of judgments.  
Let us consider again the theory at issue. It consists in a set of seven judgments or 
predications that are taken to be compatible with each other, contrary to the Aristotelian, 
exclusivist view of being and not-being. Each of these judgments proceeds as a statement 
performed by means of assertions (truth-claims) or denials (falsity-claims) about some object 
(referred to by “it”):  
 
 
syād asty eva arguably, it exists assertion 
syān nāsty eva arguably, it does not exist denial 
syād asty eva syān nāsty eva arguably, it exists; arguably, 
it does not exist 
successive assertion and 
denial  
syād asty eva syād 
avaktavyam eva 
arguably, it is unspeakable simultaneous assertion and 
denial  
syād asty eva syād 
avaktavyam eva 
arguably, it exists; arguably, 
it is unspeakable 
assertion and simultaneous 
assertion and denial 
syān nāsty eva syād 
avaktavyam eva 
arguably, it does not exist; 
arguably, it is unspeakable 
denial and simultaneous 
assertion and denial 
syād asty eva syān nāsty eva 
syād avaktavyam eva 
arguably, it exists; arguably, 
it does not exist; arguably, it 
is unspeakable 
(assertion and denial and 
simultaneous assertion and 
denial) 
 
 
A formal interpretation of the above statements needs to do justice to their combined 
consistency, if it wants to make sense of them. Moreover, my formal reconstruction of the 
Jaina logic purported to give, from Schang (2011a) onwards, a precise role to a set of ancient 
concepts by relating these into a common framework or philosophical system.  
Accordingly, let us reconstruct the whole rationale by calling for a number of ancient 
concepts. The Jainas argued for a tolerant approach to truth7: anekāntavāda, which 
corresponds to a doctrine of non-one-sidedness; the latter was embedded by means of a set of 
seven plausible statements or predications (saptabhaṅgī), each of these statements (bhaṅgī) 
including one, two, or three basic statements (mūlabhaṅgī) about whether the corresponding 
sentence is true, false, or inexpressible (avaktavyam). The compatibility of such opposite 
                                                            
7 ‘Tolerance’ is to be taken here in the proper sense of the word: it comes from the Latin word ‘tolerare’, i.e. 
accepting the possibility for another view to be true for want of any conclusive evidence against it. Non-one-
sidedness results from the Jaina struggle against doctrinalist, one-sided opinions.  
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statements is due to the Jaina conventional theory of truth (saṃvṛti-satya), according to which 
truth is characterized by its conditionality (syādvāda) and leads to a general theory of 
standpoint (nayavāda). This clearly stands in contrast to the Mādhyamaka view of truth as an 
absolute or one-sided expression of reality (paramārtha-satya), all the more that this 
Buddhist stance assimilates the ultimate substance of reality with emptiness (sūnyatāvāda) 
and is thereby compelled to refuse any of four possible assertions about it (catuṣkoṭi). Finally, 
a crucial way to make sense of the two opposite schools relies upon the logical constant of 
negation: not only do the Jainas and Mādhyamikas make use of two different expressions of 
negation, the former being a negative assertion that proceeds as a relational or locutionary 
negation (paryudāsapratiṣedha) whereas the latter amounts to a mere suspension of judgment 
that occurs as a non-affirming or illocutionary negation (prasajyapratiṣedha). Despite the fact 
that the Indian schools explicitly obeyed general criteria of rationality (paribhāṣā) like non-
contradiction or inner consistency, I take the reason why the saptabhaṅgī and catuṣkoṭi have 
been blamed for violating these criteria to stem from a misleading interpretation of the 
ancient texts from the view of modern logic, with a special emphasis on the intriguing case of 
negation8. 
      For this purpose, the development of my formal works about Jaina logic has been 
devoted to a semantic background that assigns a specific role to each of the aforementioned 
concepts from ancient texts. As a result, the early logical system that has been blamed 
deservedly by Balcerowicz turned into a more cautious but surprising upshot at the first 
glance, namely: a one-valued logical system for the Jaina saptabhaṅgī.  
 
2. One-Valuedness 
 
In Schang (2011a) and Schang (2013), the 7-valued early system has been replaced by a 1-
valued, existential interpretation of saptabhaṅgī. While noticing that a similar interpretation 
has been mentioned by Balcerowicz (2008),9 a striking difference lies in the fact that the 
current truth-values are superseded in my works by other sorts of logical values. This 
difference is largely due to the import of dialogue in Indian philosophical schools, which is 
rendered by a question-answer game in the meta-language. It results in a so-called Question-
Answer Semantics (hereafter: QAS) for Jaina logic. Admittedly, there already exist logical 
                                                            
8 On the role of negation in the set of statements in the saptabhaṅgī and catuṣkoṭi, see especially Flügel 2010 
and Clavel 2010. 
9 See e.g. Balcerowicz 2008, section 3: “description of the syād-vada”. 
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devices where questions plays a crucial role in a more comprehensive theory of meaning; let 
us quote among those the cases of dialogical logic in Lorenzen (1955), erotetic logic in 
Wiśniewski (1995), or the so-called inquisitive semantics in Groenendijk (1999). Now the 
coming semantics is simpler, in that it uniquely contains yes-no questions and does not alter 
the classical meaning of the logical constants. 
After a preliminary, theoretical discussion about the meaning of a “truth-value” in 
Schang (2013), my formal reconstruction of Jainism is embedded by a non-Fregean 
semantics. Roughly speaking, the common point with Frege (1919) is that any information is 
taken to have both a sense and a reference; and the difference with it is that sense and 
reference are not defined in the same way. According to the formal semantics I hereby 
advocate, the sense of a sentence is not an extra-linguistic proposition (Frege’s Gedanke) but 
an ordered set of questions about this sentence; and its reference is not a traditional truth-
value including truth and falsity, but a corresponding ordered set of yes-no answers. It 
follows from this redefinition of meaning that the reference of sentences is still a logical 
value without being a Fregean truth-value. In the Jaina case of saptabhaṅgī, Schang (2009a) 
claimed that each of the seven bhaṅgī stands for logical values if we take these to be about 
semantic predicates like “being true” and “being false”.  
Let us consider again the logical structure of the seven statements, in the light of a 
question-answer game which helps to preserve at the same time the bivalent nature of Jaina 
logic (as urged by Balcerowicz) at the metalinguistic level of questions.  
For one thing, every statement is about the truth-value (if any) of a given sentence, 
whether the predication is about a pot or whatever you want. Every corresponding answer to 
an initial question about the sentence is either “yes” (symbol: 1) or “no” (symbol: 0), and the 
logical structure of the saptabhaṅgī can be rendered as the result of a set of three basic 
questions about an arbitrary sentence : Q()  q1(),q2(),q3(), where q1()  “Is  
assertible (justifiably true)?”, q2()  “Is  deniable (justifiably false)”, q3()  “Is  
inexpressible?”. Each positive answer to either of these three questions leads to the 
acceptance of what has been termed in Gokhale (1991) as a mūlabhaṅgi, that is, a basic 
statement to the effect that the given sentence is either true, or false, or inexpressible. As to 
the ensuing answers, they amount to statements by affirming or denying either the truth (first 
question) or the falsity (second question) of the sentence at hand. The whole combination of 
possibilities relevantly yields seven logical objects, i.e. non-Fregean logical values: (1) A() 
 1,0,0, (2) A()  0,1,0, (3) A()  1,1,0, (4) A()  0,0,1, (5) A()  1,0,1, (6) 
A()  0,1,1, (7) A()  1,1,1. This odd list of values may seem striking, but it is nothing 
but logical: given any m initial questions and n resulting answers, it always results in nm 
logical values. As we have m  3 questions and n  2 answers in the above reconstruction, 
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there should be nm  23  8 possible answers and, hence, eight logical values in an ill-named 
saptabhaṅgī. It is not so, however, the eighth case (8)  0,0,0 being merely excluded: at 
least one yes-answer is given to either of the three questions. Indeed, every sentence is taken 
to be either true, or false, or inexpressible.  
Furthermore, one of Balcerowicz’s main objections to the many-valued interpretation 
of Jaina logic is overcome by the fact that each of the seven predications includes semantic 
predicates (being true, being false, being non-assertible or inexpressible) that are betrayed 
with the help of our above three questions and don’t go beyond the bivalent values of truth or 
falsity mentioned in the ancient texts – the third question doesn’t contradict the bivalent 
character of the Jaina saptabhaṅgī, as will be shown in the subsequent sections.  
Finally, the former combination of answers has been limited to two items – yes, or no – 
because the seven saptabhaṅgī always include at least one yes-answer to the semantic 
predicates attached to the sentence: for every sentence to be assessed, the former is either 
claimed to be true, false, or inexpressible. Quartium non datur, as would be noted by the non-
classical logicians; nevertheless, these three independent questions don’t lead to a three-
valued system, contrary to a number of such views in the logical literature. Thanks to our 
non-Fregean definition of logical values, the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication does not 
result in a non-bivalent system but, rather, a one-valued logic including statements about 
truth- and falsity-claims.  
 
2.1. From Seven to One 
 
To motivate my progressive reduction from seven to only one value through four 
intermediary ones, a quick look at the formal translation is in order.  
Once again, each mūlabhaṅgī is seen a statement about the semantic predicate of a 
given sentence. Thus the first statement (1), syād asty eva, means the same as “the sentence  
 ‘x is F’ is true from some standpoint”; while the second statement (2), syān nāsty eva, 
corresponds to “the sentence   ‘x is not F’ is true from some standpoint”. Note that the 
answers to (1) and (2) are independent from each other, due to their different standpoints that 
can be opposed to each other without being expressed with one and the same respect. In other 
words: a positive answer to the first question (symbols: a1()  1) does not entail a negative 
answer to the second question (symbols: a2()  0), and conversely.  
Above all, a crucial point underlying the correlated theory of judgments in the Jaina 
theory of standpoints (nayavāda) is that the multiplexity of reality – or non-one-sidedness 
(anekāntavāda) – means that opposite standpoints are equally accepted (symbols: a1()  
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a2()  1). In a nutshell, these equally hold about the nature of the predicated object and can 
be safely stated without leading to a forbidden contradiction.  
Because of their distinctive standpoints, the two kinds of statement performed by the 
Jains are assertion and denial10. Importantly, every denial (symbols: a2()  1) is a negative 
assertion in the saptabhaṅgī; that is, whoever asserts a given sentence  thereby states “it is 
the case that “, whereas denying it amounts to state “it is the case that “. Echoing the 
formal reconstruction of Jainism, it turns out that any combination of the aforementioned 
statements nicely matches with what Belnap (1977) devised in his 4-valued logic of sentences 
–where semantic predicates are “being told (true, or false)” rather than “being (true, or 
false)”. Indeed, syādasty eva means that  is told true from some standpoint (e.g., s1), while 
syān nāsty eva states that  is told false from some standpoint (e.g., s2).  
To make sense of the multiplex and tolerant view of reality, my view is that a proper 
way to account for the Jaina non-sidedness leads to a one-valued logic, where a consistent 
acceptance of the seven bhaṅgī means that every assessed sentence can be told true and told 
false from various standpoints. Here is the unique logical value I advocated for a Jaina one-
valued system: 1,1. This pair of answers clearly differs from the alleged seven values from 
Schang (2008), where each statement was taken to be a logical value among seven possible 
triplets of answers; actually, it stems from the four exhaustive combinations of yes- and no-
answers about the first two questions, i.e. 1,1, 1,0, 0,1, and 0,0. Consequently, only one 
of the last set of reduced questions-answers is sufficient to characterize the Jaina stance in a 
logical way.  
 
2.2. Making Avaktavyam Silent  
 
Let us consider now the most troublesome topic of the Jaina predications, especially in its 
formal reconstruction, namely: the concept of avaktavyam, which corresponds to the third 
semantic predicate or mūlabhaṅga. Almost all the logical literature rendered this concept as a 
synonym for either the semantic predicate of inconsistency or that of incompleteness, that is: 
“both true or false” or “neither true nor false”. Although there can be some deep reason to 
argue for the first option – following the current interpretation of avaktavyam as a 
simultaneous assertion and denial – its other translation as “inexpressibility” tends to make it 
                                                            
10 Contrary to a number of non-classical interpretations like Sylvan (1987) or Priest (2011), the following 
section is going to show that the stance of silence is not on a par with assertion and denial. This distinctive 
treatment will crucially lead to one-valuedness, because silence does not contribute to the construction of logical 
values in QAS.  
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closer to that which cannot be true or false. I rejected both options in Schang (2011a), 
echoing another similar view about the Christian Trinity in Schang (2011b). Admittedly, it 
may seem even more irrational to claim that a sentence that is not plainly true or plainly false 
cannot be said to be “both-true-and-false” or “neither-true-nor-false” either.  
To defend this awkward stance, I argued that a sentence is said to be avaktavyam 
whenever its subject cannot be predicated at all because of its transcendental nature – like 
ātman, brahman, or whatever extramundane entity going beyond the realm of conceivable 
properties and resorting to what is called an ultimate class in set theory. Such a semantic 
predicate is attached to the sentence elliptically, in the sense that it is primarily the subject to 
which the notion of inexpressibility is attached.  
If I am right, then no predicate can be said to be “both-true-and- false” of it because no 
property is out of its scope. In other words, such a transcendental object should be said to be 
true of absolutely everything, including any given pair of a predicate and its negation. But to 
say so is meaningless, assuming that any meaningful sentence should make a clear-cut 
dichotomy between the properties that pertain to the subject and those which do not; this last 
precondition refers to Spinoza’s statement about relevant informativeness: determinatio 
negatio est, which means that a sentence can make sense only by excluding some properties 
from the range of its subject.  
At the same time, the latter negative result does not imply that every property should be 
said to be “neither true nor false” of a transcendental subject. Although avaktavyam has been 
frequently rendered as “non-assertible”, I take the latter expression to be misleading in that it 
misses the real point of a transcendental sentence, viz. that being inexpressible is being 
beyond the categories of truth and falsity. In contrast, to support this “gappy” position is to 
say that nothing can be truly said of the subject, while it has just been argued that everything 
is true of it. To escape from this circular situation requires some words about the principle of 
subsumption, according to which any sentence consists in putting a subject under the scope of 
a higher-order concept. This cannot be done with whatever is true of anything. 
The result of such a situation is, according to me, that avaktavyam can make sense in 
the Jaina saptabhaṅgī only by equating with the stance of silence. It does not collapse any 
more to the first bhaṅgī (true only) than the second (false only), or the third (true and false 
successively, i.e. from different standpoints). It does not amount to a double denial about 
whether the sentence is true and false, either (symbols: a1(α)  a2(α)  0), recalling that a 
subject that relates to everything cannot fail to have any of the available predicates. It has to 
be distinguished from the trivial silence symbolized by the forbidden eighth logical value (8) 
0,0,0: the latter means that nothing is answered about the three mūlabhaṅgī including 
inexpressibility, while avaktavyam stands for the stance of inexpressibility itself and amounts 
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to a lack of logical value.  Furthermore, this result squares with the relative view of truth in 
Jainism (saṃvṛtisatya): a sentence is true only from a partial perspective, while any absolute 
sense of truth is prohibited. This is an additional reason not to say anything about 
transcendence, i.e. whatever goes beyond the cognitive capacities of human beings. 
 
2.2.1. Neither a Logical Value … 
 
A first corollary of what has just been said is that avaktavyam cannot be part and parcel of a 
logical value in QAS; for given that any logical value consists of ordered answers, how can 
avaktavyam be taken as such once it is equated with the stance of silence? Unless you 
consider silence as a sort of answer, the last section entails a cancellation of the third 
mūlabhaṅga from the ordered answers and a reduction of the structure of a Jaina logical 
value from three to two elements, viz. only explicit yes- or no-answers to questions about the 
truth-value of a sentence. That is: for every sentence , its logical value is A()  
a1(),a2() rather than A()  a1(),a2(),a3(). Furthermore, such a reduction matches 
with what Balcerowicz and other scholars said about bivalence: only truth and falsity were 
mentioned in the Jaina texts, and it hardly makes sense to consider inexpressibility as a 
semantic predicate on a par with the two Fregean truth-values. All of this should lead one to 
reject the third question from the Jaina logic and to ignore the third mūlabhaṅgī. 
 Now three objections may be raised against my reductive strategy. 
 To the first objection that nothing justifies such a cancellation of the third question, I 
claim again that inexpressibility is not a semantic predicate assigned to a sentence but, rather, 
the view that nothing can be said about the sentence. Accordingly, avaktavyam results in a 
lack of answer about whether the sentence is either-true-or-false and cannot be treated as a 
proper logical value. In one sense, the transcendental subject both falls under any given 
predicate (asty) and lies outside its scope (nāsty) as an infinite entity. In another sense, this 
special subject neither falls under the predicate nor lies outside its scope insofar as any such 
specification cannot be duly attributed to an ubiquitous entity. Therefore, any predicate is 
both both-true-and-false of a transcendental subject and neither-true-nor-false of it. This 
hardly makes sense for whoever does not adhere to the so-called “impossible values” of 
Priest (1984) and Shramko and Wansing (2006). Instead of advocating such a hyperinflation 
of non-classical truth-values, I opted in Schang (2011a,b) for the view that inexpressibility 
refers to whatever cannot be expressed within the limits of language, i.e. its set-theoretical 
way of predicating by subsumption, and results in no logical value. 
To the second objection that silence should occur a logical value on its own, my reply is 
that a similar debate already took place in the realm of philosophical logic: to the question 
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whether the expression “neither-true-nor-false” should be considered as a third proper truth-
value in addition to the classical values of truth and falsity, it has been variously replied that 
the “gappy” value is just an algebraic object that serves as a dummy truth-value; now such a 
reply assumes a metaphysical view of bivalence, without being able to refute the introduction 
of a supplementary value on the very ground of logic. As to my proposed dialogical 
semantics, it clearly appears that silence cannot be seriously treated there as the component of 
a logical value whenever the latter corresponds to explicit answers in a dialogue. No 
metaphysics supports this first corollary of my interpretation of avaktavyam, accordingly; it 
follows from it a restricted range of four logical values in the resulting Jaina logic, as will be 
seen in the next section.  
To the third objection that the seven bhaṅgī cannot be all formulated if the third 
question is cancelled, a difference is to be made between two meanings of a “standpoint”. On 
the one hand, a sentence can be said to be true or false in accordance to what the Jaina theory 
of standpoints (nayavāda) proposes in its range of justifications. On the other hand, the 
capacity for a speaker to give an answer relies upon his capacity to give evidence for or 
against the truth of the sentence. This means that normal, cognitive-bounded agents cannot 
answer to questions once they are not able to find any evidence for the truth-value of so-
called “transcendental” sentences. Only transcendental agents can do that, i.e. God himself or 
a blessed Jina. Accordingly, I view the fifth, sixth and seventh predications of the 
saptabhaṅgī as a combination from statements that can be justified only by transcendental 
agents while making the other ones silent: a sentence is said to be both true (and/or false) and 
inexpressible if its truth (and/or falsity) can be justified by one agent and can never be so by 
another one, respectively.11 
 
2.2.2. … Nor a Case of Inconsistency 
 
A second corollary of the preceding paragraph is that avaktavyam crucially differs from 
inconsistency, whether in a successive or simultaneous interpretation of being true and false. 
If so, then para-consistency does not take in the Jaina predications through this third basic 
predication; neither does it occur in the sense of what Priest calls dialetheism, i.e. the 
simultaneous reading of being “both” true and false (from one and the same standpoint).  
The formal machinery of QAS helps to make a distinction between three grades of 
inconsistent answers, expressing these in the meta-language of questions-answers while 
keeping avaktavyam strictly apart from these. The first grade is a light inconsistency, or 
                                                            
11 About this point, see e.g. Flügel 2010.  
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inconsistency from two different standpoints: a sentence is asserted from one standpoint and 
denied from another one, which does perfectly make sense from a classical view of logic and 
is totally harmless for Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction (i.e. it is impossible to 
attribute a property and its negation to one and the same subject at once, with respect to the 
same subject and the same standpoint). In symbols: ai(α)  aj(α)  1 (where i and j are two 
different standpoints). The second grade is a mild inconsistency, i.e. inconsistency from one 
and the same standpoint: ai(α)  ai(α)  1. This second case of locutionary contradiction has 
been assimilated to avaktavyam in e.g. Priest (2008); I just argued for my rejection of such an 
option. The third and last grade of inconsistency is a strong inconsistency, or inconsistency in 
one and the same answer; although this case of illocutionary contradiction has been 
mentioned by Matilal (1991), it hasn’t been observed in the various statements thus far and 
equates with a simultaneous yes- and no-answer by the same agent to one and the same 
question: ai(α)  ai(α)  {1,0}. Actually, such an incoherent pair of answer seems to match 
with the previous case of avaktavyam: an inexpressible sentence has been viewed above as 
something equally true-and-not-true (rather than true-and-false) and false-and-not-false 
(rather than false-and-true). However, I take this interpretation to make no sense in that it 
introduces answers while rejecting them at once. This illocutionary form of contradiction 
should be reduced to silence, for want of intelligibility.  
For those who would object that doing so is just the same as the mild version of 
inconsistency, i.e. making a simultaneous assertion and denial, I would reply again that a 
subtle difference still lies in these two levels of contradiction: a dialetheist can find reasons to 
assert the truth of a sentence while asserting its falsity; however, this consists in accepting –
saying “yes” to the question about– the first two statements (about the sentence’s being true 
and false, respectively) rather than both accepting – saying “yes” to the question about – and 
rejecting – saying “no” to the question about – one and the same statement. This ultimate 
grade of inconsistency I take to be a plain incoherence, by contrast to the dialetheist stance of 
mild inconsistency.12 Given my interpretation of avaktavyam as entailing a silence without 
logical value, this third semantic predicate is not concerned with para-consistency after all 
and also differs from its usual interpretation as a simultaneous assertion and denial (mild 
contradiction). Rather, the Jaina theory of predication is depicted in Schang (2011a) as a 
para-consistent theory in the harmless sense of inconsistency, i.e. obeying a logic of light 
inconsistency while departing from a genuine acceptance of contradictions – the second grade 
of inconsistency.  
                                                            
12 Unless Priest 1979 takes his analysis of the Liar Paradox to be a genuine counterpart of strong inconsistency? 
I postpone this hermeneutic difficulty for a later note, independently of our present concern with Jainism. 
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3. An Ancient Dual Logic 
 
Why to opt for a one-valued logic for non-one-sidedness? There may be several reasons to do 
so, as will be displayed in a couple of coming sentences.  
Now there is one main reason not to do so, given the blatant inconvenience of such a 
decision: opting for a one-valued logic thereby nullifies the crucial relation of consequence in 
a logic. The reason for this is obvious, due to the nature of logic itself: given that logic aims 
at making a difference between valid and invalid arguments (i.e. structured connections 
between sentences), a usual characterization of logic consists in saying that an argument is 
valid whenever the truth of sentences is preserved from its premise(s) to its conclusion(s). 
Now the criterion of truth-preservation cannot be but made trivial by a logical system where 
only one logical value obtains; for how to invalidate an argument where only true sentences 
occur, indeed? Assuming that modern logic is a theory of consequence between sets of 
sentences, I hardly see how the Jaina “logic” really deserves its name as it stands in a mere 
theory of predication. 
As a reply to this serious objection, I would say that logical consequence, because of its 
formal feature of connecting abstract truth-values, is not a relevant concept in the Jaina 
theory of sevenfold predication13; rather, inference has to do with the cognitive capacity of 
human agents to make causal connections between different available phenomena. This 
entails that the role of epistemic faculties (perception, deduction, kinesthesis, and the like) 
differs from the logical properties of consequence in a modern formal logic. Instead of a logic 
of consequence between sentences, the question-answer game I suggested with the 
framework of QAS insists upon some special speech acts (assertion, denial)14 expressed by 
each of the seven bhaṅgī. Hence the Jaina saptabhaṅgī concerns “logic” only in the ancient 
sense of a theory of concepts, i.e. set of rules for the formation of judgments; in this respect, 
it matches with what Aristotle did in his Categories, rather than his Analytics. It is a fortiori 
not a properly para-consistent logic, the latter encompassing all the logical systems that 
violate the so-called Principle of Explosion according to which everything follows from 
contradictory premises. Inconsistency and contradiction (mild inconsistency) have to do with 
Jainism but don’t affect Explosion, accordingly. 
                                                            
13 The saptabhaṅgī is said to be a ‘theory’ not as a theory of consequence, accordingly, but as a generalized or 
exhaustive classification of feasible statements. It is a proper logic in the ancient sense of the word, i.e. as a 
theory of judgment or predication (compare with Aristotle’s Categories).  
14 QAS does justice to the bivalent nature of the saptabhaṅgī: there are only speech acts at hand in it, because 
any speech act stands for an answer to a given question. Once again, silence is not a speech act since remaining 
silent is giving no answer at all.  
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Another reason to question a one-valued logic of non-one-sidedness is due to the 
prominent role of contradiction among the logical principles (paribhāṣā) required by the 
ancient Jaina texts: how can contradiction occur in a logic with only one logical value? A 
simple reply to this objection is that contradiction uniquely expresses a relation between the 
truth-values of truth and falsity. It is not the purpose of my one-valued system to render 
contradiction as a relation between non-Fregean logical values but, rather, to explain how the 
Jaina theory of judgment came to accept allegedly contradictory sentences by means of 
several standpoints. An alternative, stronger sort of contradiction that could occur in a 
question-answer semantics is that between the answers themselves, namely: answering both 
yes and no to the one and the same question. Such a contradiction is an illocutionary one, in 
the sense that it defeats the rational behavior of a speaker; it relates to the third grade of 
strong inconsistency and stands for a grade of inconsistency that infringes the criterion of 
coherence. Light inconsistency does not violate contradiction, however.  
Turning to the advantages of one-valuedness, the latter makes sense of light para-
consistency without introducing further truth-values beyond truth and falsity. Again, the 
question-answer game at hand constitutes a plea for bivalence (of semantic predicates) while 
combining four logical values by means of the first two bhaṅgī – the third one related to 
avaktavyam is kept apart from the current predications about empirical or non-transcendental 
subjects.  
A second reason is that the formal semantics in use brings out the role of dialogue in 
Indian schools in general, through the various question-answers games that make the 
resulting judgments meaningful; unlike the metaphysical reference to general truth-values, 
the very value of dialogues is provided by answers that essentially rely upon the context of 
questioning and leads to one and the same ordered pair of answers. The positive philosophy 
of tolerance and open-mindedness that characterizes the Jains is betrayed by the twofold yes-
answers of Schang (2011a), these being expressed by one positive assertion and one denial 
corresponding to a negative assertion. Assertion is a linguistic mark of positivity whether it is 
about an affirmative or a negative sentence, viz. a positive attitude of commitment. 
Thirdly, the semantics I proposed helps to overcome the pitfall of avaktavyam by 
distinguishing the latter from the unique value 1,1: avaktavyam refers to the inexpressibility 
(or indescribability) of an object and, elliptically, that of the corresponding sentence where 
the latter occurs as a subject. Importantly, the various grades of inconsistency couldn’t be 
expressed within the mainstream bivalent logic of truth-values and essentially relies upon the 
question-answer game. Indeed, being both true and false does not mean the same as 
answering both yes and no: the former corresponds to the grade of mild inconsistency, 
whereas the latter is a case of strong inconsistency. 
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And finally, this formal reconstruction of the theory of sevenfold predication brings some 
light upon a dual connection that could not be emphasized within a usual bivalent logic and 
its truth-values. The duality stands between the Jaina saptabhaṅgī and another logical device 
from the Buddhist tradition, namely: the catuṣkoṭi. Just as Bahm (1958) wondered if the first 
logic was a “reversal” of the second, i.e. its polar contrary, let us see how my formal 
machinery confirms this viewpoint in a more precise way.   
Roughly speaking, saptabhaṅgī and catuṣkoṭi appear to be twin logics that are alike in 
several respects. It has been recalled in Schang (2013) that both are soteriological discourses: 
they represent a quest for peace of mind, prior to truth. Despite of their common purpose, 
they remain opposite to each other in their methods to reach salvation through opposite 
“middle ways”: the Jains express their goal by means of combined sorts of assertion while the 
so-called Mādhyamikas do it through combined denials, where denial essentially differs from 
that of the Jains. Matilal (1998: 129) illuminated this Janus-faced impression by the 
following words:  
 
“The difference between Buddhism and Jainism in this respect lies in the fact that 
the former avoids by rejecting the extremes altogether, while the latter does it by 
accepting both with qualifications and also by reconciling them.” 
 
In both cases, the many-valuedness I advocated in the beginning turned into opposite 
one-valued systems. To account for this common treatment, a common background for these 
two logics has been devised in Schang (2011a) within the conceptual framework of QAS: a 
four-valued logic of acceptance and rejection, AR4, where the logical values amount to 
ordered pairs of answers a1(),a2(). These are on a par with Belnap’s epistemic states of 
information in his system of First-Degree Entailment (FDE) and rephrased into question-
answers just as they were formulated in the preceding section –two basic questions, four 
subsequent answers. These are the following ones and their Belnapian counterparts, in 
accordance to the Jaina expression of logical values from a reductive question-answer 
approach without inexpressibility:  
 
 
Values in AR4 Values in FDE 
 
Interpretation 
A(α)  1,0 v()  T (true only) α is true from some 
standpoint, false from no 
standpoint  
18 
 
A(α)  1,1 v()  B (both true and false) 
 
α is true from some 
standpoint, false from some 
standpoint  
A(α)  0,0 v()  N (neither true nor 
false) 
 
α is true from no standpoint, 
false from no standpoint  
A(α)  0,1 v()  F (false only) α is true from no standpoint, 
false from some standpoint 
                         
It is worthwhile to recall why only four logical values matter instead of seven: 
according to my reductive treatment of avaktavyam, the third question should be cancelled 
and reinterpreted as a mere absence of answer. For given that inexpressibility amounts to 
silence, there are only two yes-no answers at hand corresponding to the first two questions; 
this also explains why no yes-no answer can be given to the question whether a sentence is 
inexpressible: the latter is not on a par with truth and falsity, insofar as it is not a semantic 
predicate. Rather, avaktavyam is the expression of a lack of answer to the two classical 
questions.   
A natural ensuing question should be this: how to obtain one-valued systems with a 
four-valued one? The answer is that: each of the two Indian logics are considered as sub-
algebras included into AR4 in the sense that their domain of valuation is “saturated”, i.e. 
restricted to only one value among the four available ones. It is clear by now that the unique 
value for the saptabhaṅgī is 1,1. What of the catuṣkoṭi? 
The answer lies in the way in which the following tetralemma can be answered both 
negatively and consistently. Unlike the Jaina seven statements made of three mūlabhaṅgī, 
there are four statements (koṭi) made of two basic views (dṛṣṭi) (a positive and a negative) in 
the catuṣkoṭi. One of the prominent Mādhyamikas, Nāgārjuna (150-250), was said to express 
the ultimate view of denial by rejecting each of the four combined sentences:  
 
(a) A being comes out itself.     (assertion) 
(b) A being comes out the other.    (denial) 
(c) A being comes out of both itself and the other.  (assertion and denial) 
(d) A being comes out neither.    (non-assertion and non-denial) 
 
The problem is the following: how to deny each of the preceding sentences without falling 
into a plain inconsistency? My proposal is the use of the third logical value in AR4, including 
only no-answers, to make sense of Nāgārjuna’s stance. While being reminiscent of what the 
Jains called by “avaktavyam”, the attitude of the Mādhyamikas differs from the latter by 
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using negative predications rather than being merely silent about them. Besides, an 
epistemological motivation for this negative stance comes from the Buddhist absolute view of 
truth (paramārtha-satya) that departs from the Jaina relative and more tolerant approach: 
given that such a truth cannot be known, the Mādhyamikas withdraw from any commitment 
in their statements by avoiding any assertion –any truth-claim15 about sentences. Now the 
logical difficulty with such a negativist stance comes from its formal translation in classical 
logic, where each denial is rendered by the constant of negation in front of every lemma. 
 
(a’) () 
(b’) () 
(c’) (  ) 
(d’) ((  )) 
 
It is well-known that the above set of sentences cannot be accepted from a classical point of 
view: according to the law of double negation, (a’) and (b’) are contradictory to each other 
while (d’) collapses into (c’) after reduction. A many-valued way out has been proposed by 
Priest (2011) on the basis of Belnap (1977), where the four “truth-values” refer to states of 
information. Just as the seven bhaṅgī of the Jains have been often viewed as seven truth-
values, the four lemma may be equated with the four truth-values to be found in Belnap’s 
system. Let  be the sentence “A being comes out itself”:  
 
(a)     v()  T  
(b)     v()  F  
(c)    v()  B  
(d) ()   v()  N  
 
According to Priest (2011: 15), an appropriate way to make sense of denying each statement 
of the catuṣkoṭi is to resort to five-valuedness: 
 
                                                            
15 Assertion is depicted as a truth-claim throughout the present paper, taking it to be a psychological attitude 
above all. It could be objected to this definition that an assertion is successful if and only if it is about a sentence 
that turns out to be true irrespective of the speaker’s attitude. I don’t subscribe to this objective-minded 
approach, however, assuming that assertion essentially expresses a conversational attitude that does not depend 
upon how the state of the world is actually.  
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“The most obvious way to proceed is now to take this possibility as a fifth 
semantic value, and construct a five-valued logic. Thus, we add a new value, E, 
to our existing four (T, B, F, and N).” 
 
Nevertheless, exactly the same objection can be made here as with Jaina logic: why should 
any denial of a given koṭi express a proper truth-value? Just as nothing justified Ganeri 
(2002), Priest (2008) or Schang (2009a) to identify the seven bhaṅgī with independent logical 
values (whether Fregean or non-Fregean), there is no ancient Mādhyamika source where such 
a reference to five values can be found.  
An alternative way out has been elaborated in Schang (2011a), where the question-
answer game restricts the number of truth-values to the two classical items while constructing 
two sorts of unique logical values for the Jaina and Mādhyamikas theories. It also relies upon 
an illocutionary interpretation of denial in the catuṣkoṭi, as well as a related distinction 
between two negations: the Jains used a relational, locutionary negation of the realists 
(paryudāsapratiṣedha); the second mūlabhaṅgi amounts to an act of negative assertion or 
falsity-claim (symbols: a2()  a1()  1) and stands for a commitment of the speaker about 
how the world is not. By contrast, the Mādhyamikas resorted to a non-relational, illocutionary 
negation (prasajyapratiṣedha) that stands for their systematic denial and typically endorses 
an attitude of non-commitment – to be compared with the skeptical attitude of withdraw 
(symbols: a1()  a2()  0). In addition, Nāgārjuna's following stance is the key to his 
allegedly radical skepticism: 
 
“If I had a thesis, I would be wrong. But I have no thesis. Therefore there is nothing 
wrong with me.”16 
 
In the vein of my formal reconstruction, a proper logical value for this non-commitment is the 
twofold no-answer 0,0 such that a1(α)  a2(α)  0. Consequently, the alleged duality 
between Jains and Buddhists lies in the opposition between their unique valuation 1,1 and 
0,0 for any given sentence (while making an exception for the inexpressible sentences 
having to do with transcendental entities, in the Jaina case). Borrowing from the algebraic bi-
lattice of Belnap’s four-valued logic, where each edge refers to a Fregean logical value that is 
classified according to its amount of truth (t) and informativity (i), a similar structure can be 
used to explain the relation between several philosophical stances with respect to truth. 
 
                                                            
16 See Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakārikā, verse 29: “To keep one away from the vain discussions”. 
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Unlike the Belnapian truth-values, it has to be noticed again that the four logical 
values of AR4 are not truth-values but answers expressing an attitude of acceptance (ai()  
1) or rejection (ai()  0). This crucial difference helps the non-Fregean values to include the 
illocutionary attitude of withdraw by means of no-answers, whereas the Fregean truth-values 
always lead the speaker to commit in the truth of a sentence or its negation.   
 
Conclusion: The Logic of “Philosophical Logics” 
 
To summarize the general rationale of the Jaina doctrine, let me advance the following 
sketchy combination of its epistemological and logical components while stressing upon the 
 F  0,1 
 N 
   Buddhism 
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theoretical primacy of epistemology over logic (no saptabhaṅgī could come to be without a 
prior reference to cognitive viewpoints): 
 
anekāntavāda  nayavāda + syād-vāda (saptabhaṅgī) 
non-one-sidedness  theory of standpoint (epistemology) + theory of judgment (logic) 
 
Let us also notice that the borderline between ontology and epistemology is not so clearly 
marked in Jainism than in the Nyāyā school, for instance. This is due to their multiplex view 
of reality and their correlated rejection of the so-called correspondence theory of truth, 
according to which that a sentence is true if and only if it expresses one objective state of 
affairs. Although this point concerns the metaphysical roots of epistemology, it cannot be left 
aside by whoever strives to make sense of the consistent set of the seven bhaṅgī.  
A formal reconstruction of Indian logics has been described in the present paper, both relying 
upon the quotations of scholars and the explanations of ancient concepts. It has to be repeated 
that such a formalisation does not pretend to catch the entire rationale of Eastern 
philosophies, not any more than any scientific model in general. The point of such a formal 
methodology is to emphasize the salient features of a theory, recalling these words from 
Russell (1914: 68) about the import of logic in philosophy: 
 
“The old logic put thought in fetters, while new logic gives it wings.” 
 
Even the modern classical logic was retained by its own fetters, when trying to make 
sense of the consistent sets of bhaṅgī or koṭi. I hope to have shown that a formal 
reconstruction of these theories of judgment by means of contemporary methods rightly 
overcomes the objections that usually beset the works of modern logicians in philosophical 
logics. Without claiming to catch the genuine essence (if any) of Indian thought, may this 
paper fulfill the requirements of some scholars like Balcerowicz, Matilal, or whoever is able 
to go through the ancient texts at hand. Wings may lead logicians astray in their formal 
reconstructions, admittedly; it is up to the scholars to assess how far my proposal of a 
Question-Answer Semantics departs from the ancient texts as they stand.  
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